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Although  most  of the tanks of south  India  and northeast
Thailand  are nominally the responsibility of  government,  in  prac-
tice they  are  managed  as  common  property  resources.1  These
small  reservoirs  (tanks)  irrigate  anywhere  from a  few  hectares  to
over  2,000(  hectares  and some  serve  more than  1,000 farmers.  Inr
the  southernmost  state  of  India,  Tamil  Nadu,  there  are  almost  40
thousand  tanks  irrigating  910  thousand  hectares.  Many  of these
are  at  least  100 years  old  while  the  tanks  in Thailand  are  much
younger  and fewer  in  number.  In both  countries  tanks  are  used  to
irrigate  rice  during  the  wet  season  and  a  small  acreage  of  dry
season  crops.
There  is  a  wide  variation  in  the  effectiveness  with  which
the tank water  is  used.  Most  of the irrigation  facilities are,
in  some degree,  jointly operated  and cooperation is  necessary  if
one farmer's overuse or misuse  is not  to subtract  from another's
use.  Problems  of coordination  and cooperation  generally  become
apparent  when  significant  changes  occur  in the  pattern  or  level
of water.use  which  are  often  associated  with  increased  water
*Dr.  Easter  is  Professor  in Agricultural  and Applied
Economics at  the  University  of  Minnesota  while  Dr.  Palanisami  is
Associate  Professor  in  Agricultural  Economics  at  Tamil  Nadu
Agricultural University.  The  authors wish  to thank John Dixon
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1Most  of  the examples  given  in  this paper refer to  south
Indian tanks  since our data  base  for these tanks is  better than
the  one for  the  tanks  of northeast  Thailand.scarcity.  In  many  of the  tanks  in south  India,  water  scarcity
and  the  need  for  cooperation  is the  rule  rather  than  the
exception.
If  the  users  are  unable  to  cooperate  in the  use  of the
resource  then  conflict-oriented  competition emerges  resulting  in
quick  exhaustion of the tank water supplies.  Several  attributes
and relationships  influence the use of tank water and help decide
the overall  management  of the tank systems.  In  this paper, these
attributes and relationships are analyzed  in  terms of the model
developed by  Oakerson  C19813.  The model  has four components --
technical/physical attributes, decision making arrangements,
pattern of  interaction and outcomes.  Each component  is  analyzed
using the tank management characteristics of  a sample of ten
tanks  in  south  India  (Tamil Nadu State)  and seven tanks  in north-
east  Thailand.
Technical  and Physical  Attributes
South  India
Each  farmer  in the  tank command area  is  potentially  eligible
to receive water supplies from the tanks  in  proportion to  the
farm size  until  the tank water supply  is  exhausted.  The limiting
condition  in  the use of tank water in south  Indian tanks  is the
storage capacity of the tanks and quantity of  water available to
fill  the tanks.  Some of the tanks are  filled  more than once  a
year while others  may be completely filled only once  in  every
four or five years.
£=Tank siltation and  agricultural  encroachment  in  the  tank
foreshore  area  have  reduced  the  storage capacity  of many  of the
tanks,  thus  reducing  water  supplies  (see  Figure  1).  The  location
of  the  sluices  (outlets)  in the  tank,  either  upper  or  lower,  also
affects  the  amount  of  water  delivered  to  farmers.  The  upper
sluices  in  the  silted  tanks  cannot  provide  water  unless  the  tank
water level  is  high.  In  years  when  the  tank  water  supply  is
inadequate farmers served  by  upper sluices may get  little or no
water.
In years of water shortages  farmers  in the tail-reaches of
the system are excluded  by virtue of their  location.  What  little
water they receive will  arrive  late.  Sometimes this exclusion  by
location  is due to poor design:  two of the ten Indian  tanks were
constructed  based  on a  faulty design which  placed the sluice
gates  below the  level  of the upper command  area.  Thus the
farmers  in  the upper command area  are excluded because of  their
location even though  the two tanks store enough water.
The other physical  constraint, which  influences the water
supply and the amount  of exclusion  because of location,  is  the
source of water.  The primary  tanks have water rights  on  peren-
nial  sources of water such as  large  rivers  or  reservoirs  and have
adequate  water  supplies  to  irrigate  one crop  for all  farmers  in
the  command  area.  In  contrast,  supplementary  tanks  suffer
frequent  water  shortages  since  their  main  source  of  water  is  run-
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4irrigated  by  supplementary  tanks  will  be  frequently  excluded
because  of  location.
The  installation  of  private  and community  wells  in the  tank
irrigated  areas  have  helped  overcome  some of  the  water  supply
constraints  in the  south  Indian  tanks. 2  Return  flows  from
surface  irrigation  and the  tanks  themselves  recharge  ground
water.  Thus  the  wells  allow  farmers  to  re-capture  some of the
water lost  through excessive  irrigation.
Comparison with Thailand
For the tanks of northeast  Thailand, the major technical  and
physical  constraint  is the inadequate distribution system which
is  improperly operated.  Although the government constructs the
tanks and provides the main canals  for large  tanks, the  laterals
and  field channels are the  farmer's responsibility.  In  most
cases the channels and  laterals have never been constructed  while
the main canal  is  allowed to deteriorate because of  little or  no
maintenance.  In  some of the smaller tanks not  even a main canal
has  been  constructed.
Thus  for the  tanks  in  Thailand  the  problems  are  primarily
below the tank outlets while those  in the  south  Indian  tanks tend
to  be  above the outlets.  This  is  because  the tanks  of
northeastern Thailand are mostly  less  than 20 years old while
many of the south  Indian tanks have been  in  operation for over  a
century.  The age difference has resulted  in a  significant
2 There is  little or  no well  irrigation  in  northeast  Thailand
because  of saline groundwater.
5difference  in  the physical  and technical  problems.  The above the
outlet  problems  facing  south  Indian  tanks  appear  to  be  more
difficult  for  community organizations to  solve  because  of the
large  investments  required  and  the  conflicts  over  land  rights
between  tank  irrigated  farmers  and  farmers  encroaching  (planting
crops)  in the water storage area  CPalanisarmi  and  Easter,  1983a].
The tank investment  is  a typical  indivisible large  invest-
ment.  However, the rights to the water in  the tank can  be
divided  and those rights can be either public or  private.  Thus,
the  indivisibility aspect  does not  necessarily pose any special
problems to resource management once the project  is  built.  The
one exception to this is  canal  maintenance.  Responsibility for
maintenance of canals serving more than one farmer must  be agreed
upon and enforced.  Does the person at  the end of  the canal  have
to maintain the whole canal  while those at  the head only maintain
the upper  part of  the canal?  How should the responsibilities be
divided to  maintain this indivisible asset?  This  is  a  problem
which  plagues many  irrigation systems all  over the world  CEaster,
19853.
Finally  the  boundary  of the resource demand  is  defined  on
the  physical  side  by  soil,  hydrology  and  the  construction  of the
tank  and  canals.  The  irrigated  area  must  be  downhill  and  a
reasonable  distance  from  the  tank  and the canals.  On  the  supply
side  the  resource  is  defined  by  the  capacity  of the tank and the
source of  water.  The capacity of the  canals  can  also  place  a
limit  on  who gets water during  peak  irrigation periods.  But  when
6the  source  of  water  is  a  large  river,  and the  delivery  system  is
ample then  there  are  few  water  supply  constrairts  except  in
drought  years  and  .lointness  in  supply  exists.  However,  the
supplemental  (rainfed)  tanks  of south  India  have  frequent  water
shortages  and  jointness  does  not  exist,  in  many  cases,  since  one
farmer's  use  may subtract  from  the  supplies  of  others.
Decision Making  Frrangements
Collective Use  (India)
Certain decision making  arrangements result  from the nature
of technical  and  physical constraints.  With the main objective
of the farmers to obtain their share of the tank water supplies,
various decision making  arrangements or rules have evolved  both
at  the  tank and  farm  levels. 3 The  conditions  for  collective  use
arise  when  tank  water  scarcity  occurs  forcing  farmers  to  compete
for  their  share  of  water.  The  best  example  of  collective  use  is
the  informal water user organization at  tank  level.  There exists
a  strong relationship  between  the  degree  of water  scarcity  and
the  activity  level  of water user organizations  (WUO).  During
periods  of water  scarcity  the  benefits  from  cooperation rise  and
so  do the  activities  of  the  WUO.  Even  in  the  primary  tanks  where
water  is  usually  not scarce  farmers  cooperated  during  the  1983
drought.  They  implemented  a  water  rotation  schedule  to  conserve
their  limited  tank  water  supplies.
3 Share is  usually defined in  terms of the  acreage  irrigated.
Thus farmers with  the largest  acreage generally receive the
largest  shares.
7F  second  condition  for  collective  use  at  tank level  is  a
reasonably  uniform distribution  of benefits.  One measure  of  this
uniformity  is  the  farm  size  variation  within  the  tank  command
area.  The  sample  of  ten Indian  tanks  shows  that  the  smaller  the
variation  in  farm  size,  the  more  farmers  participate  in organiza-
tion decisions and the more  likely they  are to form WUO  (see
Table  1).  When farms are about  the same size,  farmers  will
obtain approximately equal  benefits and have equal  interest  and
influence  on  decisions  concerning  the  allocation  of inadequate
tank water supplies.
Finally, trusted  leadership  in  the WUO  is a  key factor  in
the success of  tanks both  in  India and Thailand.  The  leadership
must  be effective in organizing  community  irrigation activities
and  honest  in the handling  of community funds used  for  irriga-
tion.  In  a number of  tanks in Thailand  inadequate  finances
and/or  the  misuse  of  finances  caused  WUO to  fail  or become
inactive  [Tubpun,  1981;  Russell  and Nicholson,  1981,  p.  51-52].
Operating Rules  (India)
The collective use of  tank water requires a set  of  basic
operating rules.  For the south  Indian tanks these rules include
the  following:
1.  Rotation  schedules  for  tank  water  and  indi-
vidual  canals.
£.  Water  release  and closing  dates at  the  tank
(see Table 2).
8Table 1
Tank  Management  in  Relation  to  Farm Size  Variation
and  Farmer  Organization,  South  India,  1982
An Active  Farm  Size
Water  Users'  Average  Farm  Variationa  Overall Tank
Tank  No.  Organization  Size  (acres)  (percent)  Management
1.  Yes  2.0  31  Good
2.  No  3.1  66  Adequatec
3.  No  2.5  51  Adequatec
4.  Yes  1.3  24  Good
5.  No  2.0  86  Poor
6.  No  1.9  72  Poor
7.  No  1.9  91  Poor
8.  No  1.9  91  Poor
9.  Yes  1.1  33  Good
10.  No  2.3  104  Poor
aThis is  the  coefficient  of  variation  (C.V.)  in  farm  size.
bOverall  tank  management  is  based  on  a  subjective  judgment
of  the  tank's  operation  in  terms  of  water  storage,  water  alloca-
tion, water  conflicts  and  crop  yields.  It  is  a  comparative
judgment  among  tanks.
CTanks  2  and  3  are  primary  tanks  and have  surplus  water  in
most  years.  Thus  little  water  management  was  required  to  achieve
high  yields  in  1982.
SOURCE:  K.  Palanisami  and  K.  William Easter,  1983.
9Table  2
Starting  and Closing  Dates  and Total  Days




November  December  January  February  March  Irrigationa
Tanks  1981  1981  1982  1982  1982
Tank  1  S  27th  6th  11
C
2nd  10th
Tank  2  S  4th  continuous  supply  for  6  months
C
Tank  3  S  9th continuous  supply  for  6  months
C
Tank  4  S  20th
C  10th  21
Tank  5  S  16th
C  20th  96
Tank  6  S  22th
C  18th  89
Tank  7  S  29th
C  20th  22
Tank  8  S  26th
C  23rd  28
Tank  9  S  1st  25th
C  18th  lth  67
Tank  10  S  17th  6th
C  0th  0th  22th  55
S  - Starting  tank  irrigation
C - Closing  tank  irrigation
aThe days  of  irrigation  refer  to  one  crop  season.
103.  A minimum water  level  in the tank for fish
product ion.
4.  Canal  maintenance  charges  in rupees  and/or
man days  of labor  to be  provided  by  each
farmer  according  to  the  farmer's  location  and
area  owned.4
5.  Sanctions  and  penalties  against  farmers  who
violate the tank water management rules.
Several  additional  rules are  introduced during  periods of
extreme drought:  (1) rules for sharing  well  water when demand
exceeds  capacity, and  (2)  priorities concerning tank  water  use
for those who cannot  obtain well  water due to  their location.
The  rules  for  tank  water  rotation  are  usually  activated  once
the  tank  supplies  are  known to  be  inadequate.  In  general,  the
operating  rules  did  not  exist  in  the  following cases:  (1)  where
farmer  conflicts prevent  cooperation  (tank  10)  and  when  tank
water  supply  is  in surplus  (tanks  2  and  3  in  1982).
In  only  three  of  the  south  Indian  tanks  were  all  five  of the
operational  rules  in  effect.  These  were  the  three  tanks which
had  WUO.  However,  most  of the  sample  tanks  from  India  estab-
lished  tank  water  release  dates  and made  collections  for  mainte-
4 0riginally the  contribution  of  labor  by  the  farmers  for
tank  maintenance  and  repair  was  a  regular  feature  (called
Kudimararathu  which  means  cooperative  repair  work)  but  it  is not
prevalent  among  Indian tank  users  today.
11nance.  One  of  the  two  primary tanks  established  a  minimum water
level  for fish  production.
Sanctions and penalties are  used  only  in tanks with WUO.
Those  who violate  the  water  management  rules  are  deprived  of  tank
water  or  required  to  pay  a  fine of  Rs  20-30  per acre.  When
police cases are filed  against violators the leaders of the WUO
usually  intercede and resolve the problem.
The  president  of the  WUO  informally  nominates one farmer  in
each  distributory  (secondary  canal)  to  monitor  the  water  distri-
bution  and collect  fees  and  solicit  labor  for  canal  and  tank
maintenance.  These  representatives  report  to  the  president  if
any problems arise.  The WUO members usually meet  once every two
weeks or  so during the  irrigation season to deal  with  problems.
The frequency of meetings usually  increases during the end of the
cropping  season when the water supply  is  low and  irrigation
critical.
External  Arranqements  (India)
The abolition of ownership  rights  to  private tanks and the
takeover of the tanks by  the Government  of  India  from the
Zamindars after  India's independence  made  the  tanks  a  common
property resource.  The  farmers owning  land  in the area served  by
each  tank have the right  to use the tank water.  The Tank
Restoration Scheme which was established  to survey  and  improve
the  physical tank  structures helped  to fix  standards for each
tank for future  structural  improvements.  The  government  also
provides  grants  for  periodic  tank  maintenance  above  the  outlet.
12Maintenance  below the outlet  is  the responsibility of the
farmers.  However,  government  funds  available  for maintenance  are
less  than  what  is  required  to  prevent  a  general  deterioration  in
the  physical  structures.  One  reason  why  this  occurs  is  that
there  is  no  relationship  between  the  water  fees  government
collects  from  farmers  and the  budget  allotted  for  maintenance  of
each  tank.  The  water  fees  collected  become  part  of  the  general
government  revenues  while  maintenance  funds  are  allocated  to each
administrative  division  of the Public Works Department  on an
arbitrary basis.  The  funds provided each  division tend to  be
allocated  to tanks with  emergency repair needs and  minor repairs
are usually neglected.
The actions  of  the  state  government  of Tamil  Nadu  which  have
had  a  critical  impact  on  tank  management  involve;  the  issuing  of
Patta  (rights  to land)  to encroaching  farmers, the  introduction
of  social  forestry  inside  the  tank  water  storage  area  and  the
implementation  of  tank rehabilitation  measures.  Encroachment  on
the  tank foreshore  area  is  a  very  common  and serious  problem  in
tanks  which  do not  fill  to  capacity  inmost  years  (see  Figure  1).
Farmers  have  gradually  cultivated  the  tank  foreshore  or  water
storage  area  until  as  much  as  20 to  50  percent  of the  area  is  now
cultivated  in  many  tanks.  After  crops  are  grown  in  the  foreshore
area  for  several  years  cultivators  begin  establishing  their
rights  on these  lands  [Department  of Agricultural  Engineering,
19823.  The  cultivators  petition  the  government  requesting  that
they  be  allotted  some  of  the  foreshore  area  arguing  that  the
13lands  are  idle.  The  government,  after  receiving  a  number  of
petiticn-s  from  cultivators,  issued  patta to  these  farmers.  This
right  is  called  kulanmkorvai  Datta  under  which  the  tank  foreshore
lands  legally  became  cultivated  lands  [Palanisami  and Easter,
19833.  The  government's decision  encouraged  encroachers  to
expand their  cultivation  of  the  foreshore  area.  In  one  of the
sample  tanks  this  resulted  in  conflicts  between  encroachers  and
tank  irrigated  farmers,  resulting  in  inefficient  tank  water
distribution  and  low crop  yields.
The  government  also intervenes  in  tank  management  through
the  farm  forestry.program  for  planting  trees  on  vacant  lands
which  includes  the  tank  foreshore  areas.  Currently  this  program
is  initiated  by  the  Government  of Tamil  Nadu  through  the  State
Forestry  Department  with  funds  from  the  Swedish  International
Development  Agency.  Acacia  arabica  trees  are  grown  on  a  10  year
rotation.  Farmers  feel  that  in  about  ten  years  the  trees  planted
in  the  foreshore  areas  will  be  large  enough  to  reduce  the  tank
water  storage capacity and make  it  difficult  to desilt  tanks.
Thus  the  social  forestry  program  may  have  some negative  impacts
on  tank  irrigation  which  are  being  ignored  by  the  Tamil  Nadu
State  Forestry  Department.  5
5 Both the  encroachment  and  the  problems  created  by  farm
forestry  might  be  eliminated  if  the  WUO had  legal  status.  If
they  were  considered  legitimate  by  government  then  they  could
more  effectively  argue  their  cases  against  the  misuse  of farm
forestry  and encroachers.  Currently  only  one of the  three  WUO  is
a  legal  entity  and  it  is  the  most  effectively  managed tank.
14In  recent  years, there has been more  interest  in  improving
crop  production from tank  irrigated areas.  Since  many tanks are
supplemental  tanks,  measures  to increase  the  water  supply
delivered  to the  farmers'  fields are being  tried..  In  selected
tanks the government has  introduced  rehabilitation measures
including  the lining  of the  main canals  and the  provision of
community wells.  Community wells have been  installed  in two of
the  ten sample tanks and canal  lining was completed  in  another.
All  of these  investments had  rates of return equal  to or better
than  investments  in  the  private  sector  CPalanisami  and  Easter,
1984a].
Comparison with  Thailand
For north Thailand,  the  conditions for  collective use  were
not as  strong  as  they  were  in south  India.  The  tank  systems  are
primarily  less  than  20 years  old  and are  used  to  provide  three  to
four  wet  season  supplementary  irrigations  for  rice.  Since  the
tank water supply  is  usually  in  excess of  demands  for  irrigation
water  during  the  wet  season,  farmers  have  little  incentive  to
conserve  water.  However,  in some  tanks  delivery  schedules  are
developed  for  all  or part  of the  command  area.  Usually  project
officials,  the village  head,  informal  groups of  farmers and water
user organizations  (when they exist)  establish the schedules both
for the wet  and dry seasons  [Apinantara  and  Sriswasdilek,  19863.
During the dry  season water  is scarce  and  there is  a
stronger  incentive  for  efficient  water  use.  However,  for many
tanks  the  lack  of  labor  and markets  during  the  dry  season  limits
15irrigation.,  In  a  few  tanks  where  the  labor  supply  is adequate,
farmers  at  the  head  of the  canal  allocate  a  portion of  their  land
to other  farmers  (usually  friends or  relatives)  whose  lands
cannot  be  reached  efficiently  by  tank  water.  In  one tank  farmers
were  able  to  use  the  lands  in the  head  reaches  during  the  dry
season  because  they  lost  their  wet  season  crop  due  to  flooding.
The  farmers  who "rent"  the  lands  pay  no cash  rent  but  help  the
land  owners harvest  the  wet  season  rice  crop  and  after  the  dry
season,  prepare  the  land  for planting  the  wet  season  rice.
Tank  operating  rules,  in addition  to  those  for  delivery
schedules,  are  becoming  more  common,  In northeast  Thailand  rules
have  been developed which restrict  fishing  in the tanks either  by
area or time of the year.  Some  of the tanks have special  fishing
days where anyone  car, fish  for a  fee.  Funds collected  in such
events  are  generally  used  to  improve  the  tanks.  Livestock  are
also being  restricted  to certain areas of the tanks and fines are
levied  if  livestock  are  found damaging  irrigation structures.
Finally rules concerning the contribution  of  labor and  capital
for project  maintenance are  being  adopted  more widely.
The  government's  invo1vement  with  the  tank  management  is
limited.  The  Government  of  Thailand  (GOT)  does  not  collect  water
charges  from the  farmers.  Thus,  tank'  water  is  almost  a  free  good
to farmers.  The  government  has  tried  to  improve  water  use  by
starting  water  user  organizations  (WUO)  at  each  tank.  But  due  to
6 Dry  season  production  appears  to  be  limited by  uncertain
market  conditions  for  many  of the  dry  season  crops.
16lack  of  training,  funds  and  other  incentives,  many of the  WUO  are
inactive.  With  a  future  growth  in  demand  for  dry  season  crops
likely,  GOT  has  taken  steps  to improve  tank  water  use  through
land  consolidation  and  land  leveling  CPalanisami,  1984b3.  The
payoff  from  these  investments  will depend  on collective  use  of
tank  water  and  the  opportunity  cost  of  labor  in the  dry  season.
Pattern  of  Interaction
Given the  technical  and  physical  constraints  and  the
decision  making  arrangements  for tank  management,  it  is  important
to  identify the pattern of interaction which characterizes the
farmer's  behavior  in  tank  management.  The  primary  pattern  of
interaction  in  the  successful  joint  use  of  tank  water  is  reci-
procity, which  depends  upon mutual  expectations  of  positive
performance.
South  India
Some of  the  patterns adopted  involved  a  direct  substitution
of  management  for scarce  water.  In  three  of the  ten  Indian  tanks
studied,  serious  efforts  were  made  to substitute  management
(which  required  cooperation) for  scarce  water.  This  occurred  in
Tanks  1,  4  and  9  where  the  amount spent  per  acre  to improve
management  was  Rs  9.8,  4.7 and  7.4 per  acre, respectively.  The
net  benefits  per  acre  due  to additional  irrigations  from  improved
management  were  high  in these  tanks  and ranged  from  Rs  43  to
Rs  73  per  acre  (see  Table  3).
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i§  (3  v  <y  a~La  iFarmers also  interact  to  increase water supplies  (see
Table  4).  Farmers owning wells have established an informal
organization which decides the price of ground  water based on the
expected  demand  for and  supply  of  ground  water during the
season. 7 In  several  cases,  tank  farmers  got  together  and
contributed  to  a  common  fund  for diverting  extra  water  from  other
(upper)  tanks  or  streams.  The  funds  collected  were  used  to  dig
diversion  channels  and clean  the  existing  channels.  In one tank
farmers diverted water  illegally from a nearby canal.  This was
done  when the water supply  in  the tank was  low during the middle
of the crop season.  In certain tanks,  private  pumping  is allowed
from within the tanks particularly when the water  in  storage has
fallen below the  level  of the sluice gates.  This primarily
benefits farmers close to the tank.
The  government  provides  loans  and  installs  community  wells
to  supplement  tank  water  supplies  in  the  wet  season  and  for full
irrigation  in  the dry season.  The  farmers who benefit  from the
wells  have  to  pay  the  operating,  maintenance  and  investment
costs.  During  the  wet  season  a  well  irrigates  around  40  acres
but  during  the  dry  season  a  much  smaller  area  is  irrigated  due  to
the well  capacity  constraint.  Farmers  located  close  to the
7 The well  owners are the  most  influential  farmers  in the tank.  They  influence the  tank related matters  such  as  opening
and  closing  of the sluices,  water  allocation  schedules  and  common
fund collections.  In  times of scarcity they even give away their share of  the tank  water  to others.  But  in  several  tanks, the well  owners  constrained tank management  with a view to selling
their ground water for  a  longer period at  a  high  price.  EFor
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20community well  are  encouraged  to  utilize  it  during  the  dry  season
but  must  pay  the  full  cost  of  pumping  the  water.
Farmers  have  organized  both  to support  and  to oppose  the
idea  of  a  connecting  series  of tanks  to a  nearby  large  reservoir. 
Currently  there  is  no connecting  channel  and  water  flows  from  one
tank  to  another  in an  inefficient  manner.  In  fact,  a  number  of
the  lower tanks now  receive  less runoff than they did  before the
large reservoir was  built.  Farmers  from the  lower  tanks  orga-
nized to recommend  to the Irrigation Department  that  they
construct  a separate canal  to deliver water to all  tanks simul-
taneously.  In  this  way  upper  tanks  would  get  less  water  but
lower tanks would get  more.  In addition, the  improved water
distribution  would  provide  a  larger  effective water supply and
total  production  would  increase.  This  could  be  structured  as  a
pareto-efficient  change  by  only  redistributing  excess  water  from
the  upper  tanks.  But  as  should  be  expected,  without  some  means
of  assuring  upper  tank  farmers  that  they  would  receive  adequate
water  supplies,  particularly  in drought  years,  they  organized  to
oppose  the  plan.
In a  number of cases  farmers have  also  organized  at  the  tank,
level  to ask  the  state  government  to remove  the  trees  planted  by
the  State  Forestry  Department  in  the  tank  foreshore  areas.  This
runs  counter  to the  government's program  of social  forestry  but
farmers  believe  that  trees  reduce  the  water  supply  and make
desilting  difficult.
21In  several  tanks,  where  the  farmers  are  not organized,  the
free  rider problem  is  apparent.  For example,  in  tank  10,  the
water  supply  was  reasonably  adequate  for  the  crop  season  but  due
to conflicts  and  lack  of  cooperation,  the  water  supply  was
exhausted  through  repeated  unauthorized  opening  of the  sluice
gates.  Operators  farming  the  foreshore  area  (encroachers)  opened
the  gates  at  night  to  release  water  and  make  more  foreshore  land
available  for  crop  production.  This  caused  drainage  problems  for
the  farmers  in  the  head-reaches  of the  command  area  and  low
yields throughout the  irrigated  area.  Some of the farmers  in  the
tail-reaches only received two  irrigations as compared  to eight
in the head-reaches because of these unauthorized water releases.
Comparison with  Thailand
In contrast  to  the Indian tanks, the interaction  in  the
Thailand tanks was more limited.  It  primarily  involved  the
digging of  field  channels, establishing water delivery schedules
and the sharing  of  land  in the dry  season.  One would expect  this
situation  to change  if  water becomes scarce or the demand  for dry
season  production  increases  or  both.  They  may  also  develop
methods  for  allocating  water  during  unusual  drought  period  much
as  the  farmers  did  in the  primary  tanks  of south  India.
When  water  is  scarce,  as  it  is  in  many of  the  Indian  tanks,
mutual  action  is  required.  To  allocate  water  other  than  by
continuous  flow  requires  mutual  action  and forbearance.  In timres
of water  scarcity  farmers  next  to the  canals  must  allow  water  to
flow  by  their fields and  go  to their  neighbors.  Finally,  mutual
22action  is  the basis  for obtaining additional  water through water
diversion activities, from the digging of channels  and from
improved  system  maintenance.
Outcomes  (India)
The effect  of technical and  physical  attributes, the
decision making arrangements and the pattern of  interactions
should  all  be  reflected  in  average crop yields  for tank  irrigated
farmers  and  the  percent  of command  area  irrigated.8  Both
efficiency  and equity  or  fairness  can be  achieved  in  tanks  where
the management  level  is high.  Tanks with higher  levels of
management  should have higher crop yields and a  large  irrigated
area,  other  things  being  equal,  due  to timely  and  uniform  water
delivery.  Equity  is  achieved  in  tanks  where  farmers  with
approximately  equal  sized  holdings  cooperate  in  the  distribution
of water  supplies  based  on farm  size  (this assumes  that  the
numbers  of  landless  laborers  is  small).
8An analysis  of  rice  production  in  the  area  served  by  the
ten Indian  tanks  suggests  that  fertilizer  is  the  other  major
input besides  water  which  influences  yields.  However,  the  use  of
a  simultaneous  equation  model  shows  that  tank  and well  water
influence the  level  of  fertilizer  applied.  Thus,  it  appears  that
in  this  area  of uncertain  rainfall,  water  availability  and  its
use  are  the  key  determinants  of  fertilizer  use  and  crop
production  CPalanisami  and  Easter,  19833.  Consequently,  crop
yield  and the  percentage  of command area  irrigated  should  be  a
good measure  of tank  performance,  when  the  comparison  is  made
among tanks  having  about  the  same  per acre  water  supply.  Thus
primary  tanks  2  and  3  could  be  compared  with  each  other  but  they
should  not  be  compared  with  supplementary  tanks  which  have  lower
water  supplies.  When  crop  yields  and/or  the  percentage  of
command area  irrigated  are  relatively  low  then  performance  or
out come  is  low.
23Equity or  fairness problems  arise when a  few large  farmers
try  to dominate water deliveries.  Inefficient  water use results
when  head-reach  farmers  overuse  water  resulting  in water  shor-
tages  for  others.  Finally the "tragedy of the commons"  is
present  in tanks where water is scarce and the level  of the tank
management  is  poor.  The  end  result  involves both  losses  in
efficiency  and equity.  The water  management  strategies  adopted
by  the  farmers  in  certain  south  Indian tanks  show how both equity
and efficiency can be achieved  through  improved  tank management.
The technical  and physical  attributes of the tanks, the decision
making arrangements and  pattern of  interactions decide the equity
and efficiency  levels which can  be  achieved  (see Figure 2).
These relationships suggest  that  to achieve a  better outcome
(area irrigated  and crop yield),  these three sets of variables
should  be  studied  in detail.
The relationships among rice yield, area  irrigated  and the
management  variables can only be  shown qualitatively  (see Table
5).  In general  there are four tanks,  1, 2,  3  and 9,  which  had
relatively  high  performance  in terms  of  yield and area  irrigated.
For two of  these  tanks,  1  and 9,  the  performance  required  good
decision  making  arrangements  and patterns  of  interactions  to
overcome  physical  and  technical  water  supply  constraints.  In the
two primary  tanks,  2 and  3, the  same  level  of decision  making
arrangements  and  patterns  of  interaction  were  not  needed  to
achieve  high  performance  because  there  were  no  physical  or
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Tank  Performance  and  the  Level  of
Water  Management,  South  India,  1982a
Percent  of
Physical/  Decision  command area
Tank  technical  making  Pattern  of  receiving  Rice  yield
No.  constrai nts  arrangements  interaction  water  (Q/ac)d
1.  Med ium  Good  Active  84  13.8
2.  Low  Adequate  --  99  16.7b
3.  Low  Adequate  - 97  14.5b
4.  High  Good  Active  85  11.OC
5.  High  Poor  --  58  15.8
6.  High  Poor  --  21  14.8
7.  High  Poor  --  88  11.1
8.  High  Poor  --  90  11.6
9.  Medium  Good  Active  93  14.5
10.  Low  Poor  --  88  12.6
aThe grouping  of the  variables  low,  medium  and  high,  and  good,
adequate  and  poor  are  based  on  their  overall  performance  during  the  1982
study.  The  grouping  is  based  on  factors  discussed  in  the  Palanisarni  and
Easter  report,  1983.
bThese  tanks  are  primary  tanks  and  receive  additional  water  from
perennial  sources.
cThe  yield  is  low  due  to  very  low  1982  rainfall.  The  community  well
in  this  tank  covers  only  a  small  area  in  the  total  command  area.
dThe  yields  are  for  the  area  irrigated  and  not  the  total  command
area.
SOURCE:  K.  Palanisami  and  K.  William  Easter,  1983.
26example of  a tark with  few physical and technical  constraints but
low performance.  The  lack  of  cooperation among  farmers  led  to a
misuse  of  the  abundant  water  supply  which  resulted  in  relatively
low yields.  In tank  4  the  severe  water  supply  constraint  kept
yields  low  even  with  good  decision making arrangements and
patterns  of  interaction.  For tank  5 and  6  performance  was  poor
because of design  problems which  prevented  irrigation of the  full
command area.  Finally farmers served  by tanks 7 and  8  faced a
water supply constraint  and  were able to obtain additional  water
allocations.  Yet  they could  not  organize effectively to make
better  use  of  the  available  water.
Cornc  us ion
Management  of  the  tank  irrigation  systems  in  south India  and
northeastern  Thailand  is  influenced  by technical  and  physical
factors.  Several decision making  arrangements  (rules) are
required  to effectively manage the tanks  as a common property
resource.  Farmers'  interactions  to adopt  decision  rules  are
needed  to achieve  equity and efficiency  in  water  use  which  in
turn  results  in higher  crop  yield  and  a  greater  area  irrigated.
The  following  actions  would  help  improve  tank  management  as
common  property  resources:  (a)  identify  the  technical  and
physical  constraints  for  each  tank  or group  of  tanks  so that
efforts  to  improve  tank management  can  focus  on  strategies  to
relax  these  constraints;  (b)  encourage  formal  and  informal  water
user  organizations  by  providing  incentives  in  terms  of  technical
assistance,  training,  legal  authority  and funds  for  organization;
27(c) transfer  ownership  of tanks  from  the  government  to  farmers
once they are  organized  into  viable  WUO.  This  can reduce  the
government  burden involved  in collecting water  fees from the
~farmers  and  in  allocating  funds  for  tank management,  which  are
currently  inadequate.  Such  a  decision  will  represent  a  property-
enhancing strategy at  the  community  level  CCoward,  19863.  By
assisting  the  local  community  in  their  property-enhancing
strategy,  the  government  could  induce  further  tank  related
investments  by  the  farmers.9
9In northeast  Thailand the  involvement  of the  local
community  in construction  of  diversion  weirs  for  irrigation  has
been  a property-enhancing  strategy.  EFor more  details,  see
K.  Palanisami,  1984a.]
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